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Abstract 
 
This research aims to find the direction of causality between rating revisions and 
economic growth in Europe during 2002-2015. Based on a system-GMM, developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1995), the-Standard & Poor’s-sovereign rating revisions’ effects on 
economic growth, controlling for other determinants, will be estimated. Rating revisions are 
shown to Granger cause output growth throughout the whole time-frame considered and no 
reverse causality was verified. We find evidence that rating revisions do impact economic 
growth while outlook announcements do not. More open economies look to have upgrade 
revisions effects on growth boosted, while negative revisions effects are dampened. Whilst 
analyzing the crisis outbreak impact, we perceived that the upgrade revisions’ effect on 
economic growth were halved. 
 
Keywords: Sovereign credit revisions, upgrade, downgrade, economic growth, system-
GMM. 
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1-Introduction 
 
Sovereign credit rating(SCR) is the debt valuation of a country or sovereign entity to 
assess a borrower’s capacity and willingness to honor its current and future debt obligations 
fully and on time, this, as a risk measure, assists investors by setting a price on their money as 
loans are made. These rankings are proposed by credit rating agencies, such as, Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s or Fitch that use a combination of economic, social and political variables to 
determine the fluctuations of these grades. Beyond these purpose, Reinhart (2002) states that 
SCR are also valuable in predicting sovereign distress, or even defaults, as it determines the 
terms and the extent to which countries have access to international capital markets. Negative 
sovereign rating revisions are associated with increases in sovereign bond yields, increased 
volatility in financial markets and significant spillovers in debt markets. Rating upgrades give 
rise to credit default swaps discount, and decreases of sovereign bond spreads, normally these 
events reflect optimistic expectations of macroeconomic conditions. Now, facing the recent 
records of the sovereign debt crisis all around Europe1, raised by unsustainable debt 
accumulations1, the analysis of variables that directly affect how countries can leverage the 
economy and through which economic growth can be boosted, seems to us of extreme 
importance. Trying to analyze whether macroeconomic fundamentals are reflected in re-
rating decisions, raises the question of the order of causality. Are these last decade downgrade 
revisions in sovereign credit rating and outlook a result of poor economic performances, the 
opposite, or have we reached a vicious cycle? Negative rating announcements create 
uncertainty and distrust in financial markets, thus pressing sovereign bond yields up, which 
together with the governments higher cost of capital, result in fiscal sustainability issues, 
unbearable levels of interests on debt and decreasing capital inflows (flight-to-quality 
argument). So, to which extent are rating revisions harming economic growth? 
Initially we employed a Panel VAR framework using rating upgrades, rating 
downgrades and GDP per capita growth rate series. Employing the Inessa Love package in 
                                                          
1 European economy saw public debt levels reach historical levels, Greece around 177% of 
GDP, Italy 132%, Portugal 130% and Cyprus 105% just to name a few. 
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STATA we analyzed Granger causality by performing t-tests on the lagged variables’ 
coefficients in each of the resulting three equations. Then we used the standard system 
generalized method of moments (system-GMM), developed by Arellano and Bond (1995), to 
investigate whether SCR revisions impact on re-rated countries’ economic growth, controlling 
for a set of fundamental economic variables. Standard OLS2 estimation is also considered for 
the sake of comparisons. 
This research aims to find the direction of causality between rating revisions and 
economic growth in Europe. Rating revisions are shown to Granger cause output growth 
throughout the 2002-2015 period, no reverse causality was verified. We find evidence that 
rating revision do effect economic growth while outlook announcements do not. More open 
economies look to have upgrade revision effects on growth boosted, while negative 
dampened. While analyzing the crisis outbreak effect, we see that the upgrading effects on 
economic growth are cut in more than half of its previous value. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short literature 
review, section 3 explains the data gathering and estimation strategy, empirical results are 
reported in section 4 and finally, section 5, provides some concluding remarks and policy 
implications. 
 
2-Literature Review 
There has been an alight debate over the utility of Credit rating agencies (CRA).    The 
standard theory behind CRA’s existence is that they correct a problem of information 
asymmetry, assisting investors’ decision-making, and fact regulate investments.  
Literature provides a lot of research on the determinants of sovereign credit rating 
(SCR) and on the determinants followed by the different CRA, namely Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch -Cantor and Packer (1996) concluded that different agencies follow the 
same criteria on attributing SCR grades. Longstaff (2011) inferred whether SCR is determined 
by country-specific risk or else by macro indicators, this study occurred in a high liquidity 
period (2000-2010) which may be biasing results, however the author concluded that macro 
                                                          
2 OLS coefficients must be handled with reasonable caution- as endogeneity may bias results. 
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variables determined SCR in the period analyzed. The most cited variables are GDP growth, 
inflation, fiscal and external balance-. Cantor and Packer (1996) and later (Afonso 2011) 
distinguished between short and long-run determinants pointing out the importance of the 
political risk index’s, external debt and default history on the long-run settlement of ratings. 
More recently Soudis (2017) indicated that policies constraining the public sector, as rule of 
law or independence of the central bank, to be the more robust variables in determining 
assessment revision.  
Stock markets behavior resulting from SCR revisions gather most research regarding 
this thematic. As sovereign bond yields serve as benchmark for interest rates in borrowing 
countries, the increase in credit default swaps instigated by downwards revisions in sovereign 
rating- Brooks et al., (2004) and Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), increases volatility in bond 
markets, while positive credit rating announcements are shown to have insignificant effects 
on yields and CDS spreads see e.g., Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) and Remolona and 
Wooldridge (2006). Indeed, such volatility may exacerbate the level of financial instability and 
its unpredictability, since high volatility levels are associated with higher risk perception of 
market participants, which results in spillover effects harming spreads of sovereign bonds 
worldwide, see for instance, - Gande and Parsley (2005), Afonso et al. (2012). Christiansen 
(2007) using a GARCH model reports evidence on US and European bond market spillovers. 
Still concerning volatility, Afonso (2014) uses a panel of daily sovereign bond returns to 
illustrate, through an EGARCH specification, that only bad news (downgrades) produce 
instability in bond markets while upgrades do not have significant effects on volatility. All 
these effects are amplified for countries rated below the investment grade threshold3, 
recalling that these countries are prohibited to harvest pension and money market funds. 
 
Regarding the predictive power of CRA, Rogoff (2003) defined SCR as a summary 
measure of a country’s likelihood to default, Reinhart (2002) related this with currency crisis, 
asserting that these should be preceded by downgrades, yet, empirical research, concluded 
that CRA fail to anticipate currency crisis and these downgrades are instead ex-post events 
                                                          
3 Following Standard & Poor’s scale, countries rated below BBB-, are in a “speculative grade” 
category. 
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(Amadou 2004). The same author while concluding that CRA fail to anticipate currency crisis, 
recognizes that these agencies do predict debt crisis, defining debt crisis as sovereign distress, 
reaching the threshold of a 1,000 basis point higher spread, countries experience reduced 
capital market access and high cost of external debt. Baum et al. (2016) revealed that CRA 
downgrade revisions had no impact on the value of the euro currency nevertheless, it does 
increase exchange rate volatility and European bond spreads. This re-priced sovereign bond 
reached all Europe and instated a climate of fear. The subjective side of CRA attributions on 
SCR is biasing default predictions in the wrong direction by creating and exasperating 
sovereign debts (Vernazza 2015), a fact supported by the Eurozone peripheral countries’ 
conditions, that are stuck in a “diabolic loop” (-see Runnemede et al. 2011) between the 
observed high levels of debt, a red flag to CRA on assessing SCR grades, and low levels of 
economic growth, avoiding agencies to change perspective. 
Acharya et al. (2011) describe a two-way feedback effect between sovereign risk and 
banking risk, which generates co-movement in the default risk of the two sectors-. BIS (2011) 
highlight two timely channels of reverse causality between these sectors, firstly in case of bank 
bailouts, sovereign, targeting financial stability may drain out public resources, worsening the 
financial markets context as investors perceived a ‘credit risk transfer’ from bank to sovereign. 
The second channel reflects the role of banks in supporting economic growth through 
intermediated financing. In this sense, a weakened banking sector constrains economic 
growth, a vital variable on assessing SCR. Alsakka (2014) explores the “sovereign-bank” 
channel, displaying evidence that SCR downgrades damage bank’s healthiness, thus greatly 
contributing to bankruptcy-. This evidence is denoted after the crisis and is more pronounced 
in the GIIPS countries. 
This research’s aim is to fill the gap between rating announcements and economic 
growth, demystifying macroeconomic variables’ responses to revisions and understanding the 
transmission channel(s) where by, in fact, agencies can interfere in real economic activity. 
Drago and Gallo (2017) draw the sovereign-corporate analogy to explain that firms, facing 
deterioration in credit conditions caused via SCR downgrades, will substantially reduce 
domestic investment and spread tight credit conditions to unrated firms. Foreign direct 
investment arrives to worsen economic conditions, changes in capital flows may be explained 
by a flight-to-quality argument, here the investor will reweight his portfolio shifting capital 
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away to safer investments in the face of stress in international financial markets, Bernanke et 
al. 1996), Hartmann et al. (2004) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) relate severe 
episodes of flight-to-quality with unpredictable market conditions and not only about assets 
payoffs, to confirm this theory one can recall the subprime crisis in the US (2008) or even the 
recent past in peripheral countries in the Eurozone affected by the sovereign debt crisis. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) seeking the answer Lucas (1990) paradox that more capital does 
not flow from rich countries to poor countries, asserts that credit market conditions and 
political risk are the main determinants of capital flow decisions, arguing that the quality of 
institutions, social factors and economic environment play a crucial role on investors 
decisions. Warnock and Warnock (2005) revealed capital flow’s importance on long-term 
interest rates in the US, showing that without any foreign flows, the 10-year Treasury yield 
would be 150 basis points higher in their research period, reducing systematic risk (Chari and 
Henry -2004-) and increasing both physical investment (Henry, 2003), thus economic growth 
(Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 2005). 
The unbearable levels of debt accumulation, which following Boumparis et al. (2015) 
acquired greater relevance after the crisis burst, on risk assessing, all around Europe and the 
fact that downgrade revisions in SCR increased the debt-burdens is nowadays a huge concern, 
Tamegawa (2016) relates that, if the debt/GDP ratio assumes a high sensitivity to CRA negative 
announcements, it could lead to excessive instability and this ratio may explode. Chen (2016) 
gathering a panel of 103 developing and developed countries, explores the effect of SCR 
revisions on output growth of re-rated and exhibits evidence that one-notch upgraded 
(downgraded) re-rated countries have an increase (decrease) of 0.6% (0.3%) of the five-year 
average annual growth rates, still, proves that high levels of external debt amplify the effect 
of negative rating announcements on economic growth. In turn, the same author, supports 
Andresen and Valenzuela (2015) who showed that countries with greater financial openness 
will have a rewarded benefit when positive announcements occur. 
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3-Data and methodology 
This research gathered a panel of 28-euro area countries (still including United 
Kingdom), see table 5 in the appendix, and 14 years of yearly data, from 2002-2015. We 
collected S&P sovereign credit rating and outlook revisions for long-term foreign currency-
denominated debt, using trading economics website, and constructed four dummy variables 
denoting upward and downward revisions for both events, to analyze these effects on 
economic growth. The credit rating agency’s choice hangs on the highest revisions frequency 
by S&P (compared with Moody’s and Fitch), hence providing a larger data set. These rating 
and outlook credit revision are presented in the appendix. Our sample reflects 171 events, of 
which 86 positive and 85 negatives in the period under analysis. To isolate these events’ 
effects, we used a set of control variables following economic growth models theory, 
accounting for standard economic, debt level, demographic, political and international trade 
variables. 
Table 1, summarizes the descriptive statistics for all variables, see the appendix table 6 for 
variables construction understanding, to begin our analysis in a transparent background.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics      
 Observations Mean St.Deviation Minimum Maximum 
5-years average GDP per capita growth 392 1.818 2.790 -5.697 20.144 
GDP per capita growth 392 1.849 4.018 -14.560 25.637 
Rating up 392 0.130 0.337 - - 
Rating down 392 0.140 0.348 - - 
Outlook up 392 0.089 0.286 - - 
Outdown 392 0.077 0.266 - - 
Government Expenditure 392 19.880 2.795 12.549 28.064 
Inflation 392 2.491 2.516 -4.480 22.537 
Fertility rate 392 1.535 0.222 1.170 2.060 
Investment in capital formation 392 22.957 4.667 9.832 41.648 
Institutions Quality 392 1.208 0.426 -0.070 1.920 
Years of schooling 392 15.814 1.255 12.500 19.200 
Openess Trade 392 115.518 63.687 45.609 391.497 
Tradedeficit (dummy) 392 0.591 0.492 - - 
High openness trade country(dummy) 392 0.288 0.454 - - 
High openness*Rating up (Int.) 392 0.031 0.172 - - 
High openness*Rating down (Int.) 392 0.041 0.198 - - 
Below Investment Grade country (dummy) 392 0.156 0.363 - - 
Net external debt 280 28.319 47.725 -156.724 128.228 
High external indebted country (dummy) 280 0.350 0.478 - - 
High external*Rating up (Int.) 280 0.036 0.186 - - 
High external*Rating down (Int.) 280 0.093 0.291 - - 
    
 
 
a)Granger causality te 
 
Dummy variable means hints the number of observations within the sample. Thresholds for countries to be considered has High opened 
and Highly indebted calculated wi hin the sample equals, 138,8 % of GDP and 61,8% of GDP. Int. is the abbreviation for interaction.  
10 
 
 
To study the causality between economic growth and rating revisions, we modelled 
this relation as a tri-variate equation, and performed a Granger causality tests, (see Granger 
1961) to observe if past values of one variable help predicting the other. 
Thus, the equations are: 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 =∝1+ ∑𝑖=1
𝑛 𝛽𝑖𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−𝑖+∑𝑖=1
𝑛 𝛽.𝑖 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑖+∑𝑖=1
𝑛 𝛽..𝑖𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡−𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑗,𝑡=∝2+ ∑𝑖=1
𝑛 𝛿𝑖𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−𝑖+∑𝑖=1
𝑛 𝛿.𝑖𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑖+∑𝑖=1
𝑛 𝛿. .𝑖 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡−𝑖+𝜇𝑖 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑗,𝑡=∝3+ ∑𝑖=1
𝑛 𝜃𝑖𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−𝑖+∑𝑖=1
𝑛 𝜃.𝑖 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑖+∑𝑖=1
𝑛 𝜃. .𝑖 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡−𝑖+e𝑖𝑡 
Here 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ stands for the one year GDP per capita growth rate, 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑝 and 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 are the already mentioned binary variables. At this stage, we will apply some 
econometric routines (Pooled OLS, System-GMM) to model the rating announcements’ 
impact on economic growth, introducing a well-timed set of control variables presuming 
robust findings. 
The model 
The liaison between sovereign rating/outlook revisions and economic growth may 
suffer from a reverse causal effect i.e. rating agencies may decide when to revise grades basing 
the decision on economic growth performance (Mellios and Paget-Blanc 2006) whereas the 
opposite may also occur. Time-invariant effects, such as geography and demographics may be 
correlated with the explanatory variables. This translates into the possibility of endogeneity 
problems that may be mitigated using -system GMM- (Arellano and Bover ,1995; Blundell and 
Bond 1998) that ensures unbiased estimators. System GMM, employed to capture the link 
between SCR revisions and economic growth,  is derived from the estimation of a system of 
two simultaneous equations, one in levels (with lagged first differences as instruments) and 
the other in first differences (with lagged levels as instruments) this model opposing the 
differenced-GMM has decent finite sample properties, which is pertinent to our research, 
given that, we have a larger country set, N, than yearly observations, T, and because we will 
break the time series in the international crises year (2008) increasing the gap between N and 
T. 
b) System GMM 
11 
 
Our dynamic panel approach, system GMM, will ease any inconsistency caused, 
perhaps, by endogeneity problems. The model is specified as: 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+4 = 𝛽0𝑦𝑡−1+𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑈𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝛽2𝑅𝑎𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑈𝑝𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4𝑂𝑢𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
   
+∝ 𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝜂𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 ; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇       (1)    
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+4 stands for the mean of the real per capita GDP growth for country i, 
from period t to t+4, this variable uses overlapping data to maximize the time-series (Bekaert 
2001,Harvey and Lundblad ,2005, and Panniza and Presbitero 2014), still, in order to use this 
variable until 2015 we forecasted each country’s real GDP per capita growth rate  up to 2019 
through an autoregressive process using STATA software, this criteria, of averaging growth 
rates, was preferred so as to cross of any business cycles outcome. We follow BAKAERT (2011) 
and Panniza and Presbitero (2014), and include the lagged logarithm of  real GDP per capita 
, 𝑦𝑡−1introducing the initial state of GDP growth, Note that this initial state of GDP per capita 
will never be overlapping the dependent variable. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑈𝑝𝑖,𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑈𝑝𝑖,𝑡 
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡represent our rating and outlook revisions dummy, denoting 1 if any of these 
events occur and 0 otherwise, rating and outlook revisions may arise in the same year. The set 
of control variables is denoted by 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , finally 𝜂𝑡 represents year-specific dummies to control 
cross-country correlations that may be induced by time trends in the error terms. All data 
specifications are in the Appendix. The disturbance term is represented as: 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡=𝜇𝑖+e𝑖𝑡 
where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 denotes the error term, 𝜇𝑖 is the unobservable country-specific effect, that 
may be correlated with the explanatory variables, and e𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic shock. To avoid 
possible endogeneity problems resulting between 𝜇𝑖 and the explanatory variables, following 
Arellano and Bond (1991), one will use first-differences to eliminate country-specific effects 
that are not time-varying. After accounting for the fixed effects, system GMM, to avoid the 
still existent correlation between the differenced lagged dependent variable and the 
disturbance process, which now is an MA (1). System-GMM augments a first-differences 
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GMM, with the levels equation adding instruments to the model. In this equation variables 
are instrumented with their own differences.  
 We make use of robust standard errors that are consistent under panel-specific 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in one-step estimation. The estimation reports three 
additional tests: Arellano Bond AR(1), AR(2) and Hansen tests. The Arellano Bond test for 
autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced 
residuals. The test for AR(2) is peremptory, because if it detects autocorrelation in levels (thus 
rejecting the null) , the model is invalid. The Hansen J statistic ascertains whether “the 
instruments as a group are exogenous”, thus for the sake of validity, the higher the p-value 
the better. 
 
Variables Choice 
Dependent Variable 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+4 – Supported from the Granger causality hypothesis, rating announcements 
will affect economic growth, consequently we constructed a five years average GDP per capita 
growth, as a dependent variable, we use a five year average to purge any business cycle effect. 
Overlapping to maximize the time-series. Forecast estimation is employed, allowing the 
research to have this variable constructed up until 2015. 
Rating variables 
We expect positive rating/outlook revisions to have a positive impact on economic growth 
while negative announcements to have negative correlation with output growth. 
Control variables 
We have divided the set of control variables into two subgroups, one for the country specific 
features (1), the later for the trade relations with the rest of the World (2), due to model 
specification that effortlessly explodes the number of instruments. 
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Initial GDP per capita -This variable is used to control for the convergence effect (catch-up 
effect). We assume that countries with lower levels of per capita GDP have propensity to grow 
faster than the ones with higher levels, thus we expect this coefficient to be negative. 
Government Expenditure - The relation between growth and the government size in the 
economy is ambiguous, in an “homogeneous” panel such as the European union 28, there are 
examples of positive and negatives effects of public expenditure on growth. 
Inflation - There is an alight debate over the inflation impact on economic growth, and about 
the bounds through which this variable will boost or harm GDP, ergo, in this panel set with 
moderated levels of inflation, following -Barro (2013)-, we expect a negative link between 
these series, as inflation harms growth via the investment channel. 
Fertility - We expect fertility to be positively correlated with growth.  
Trade openness - Here we attempt to measure the degree of economic openness, spotting the 
amount of international trade which occurs in a country. High levels of internationals trade 
interaction are associated with liberal trade policies, this notch of globalization is helpful 
towards growth purpose.  
Investment in capital formation – We expect gross capital formation to have a positive 
increment in the direction of the dependent variable. 
Institutional Quality - This variable drive is to reinforce economic performance, as it measures 
the institutions efficiency on promoting private sector development, thus we expect a positive 
link between these. 
Years of Schooling - Education is expected to boost long-run economic expansion. 
Trade dummy- Here, we are studying the effect of trade deficits on average growth, and  we 
expect negative links. 
Below investment threshold dummy- Assuming Standard & Poor’s gradation, countries rated 
below BBB grade. We suppose that states in this conditions have a downwards gap on average 
growth. 
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High External debt dummy- This variable is expected to denote lower growth values for high 
external indebted countries, as the foreign dependence is negatively correlated with 
economic performance, plus interests paid on debt obligations play a huge role on 
contemporaneous European economics. 
GIIPS dummy- A trial to empirically find that the peripheral countries have lower average 
growth. 
 
4-Estimation results 
To study causality between variables, we performed a panel VAR, using the Inessa Love 
routine4, and applied a classic t-test to each variable’s first lag in all three equations. Observing 
Table 1, equation (1) displays that all lagged variables are significant, which is to say positive 
and negative rating announcements Granger cause output growth, if positive (negative) SCR 
announcements take place, GDP growth will tend to increase (decrease), as all variables are 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. Regarding equation (2), the null hypothesis 
that growth does not Granger cause positive events, is not rejected and there is evidence that 
the occurrence of SCR upward revisions in time t will increase the probability by 0.238 
probability points of positive announcements in t+1, while negative announcements seem to 
decrease that same likelihood by 0.272 probability points.  In equation (3) there is similar 
behavior, i.e., growth does not Granger cause negative revisions and negative announcement 
contribute to higher downward announcements in the following year (0.452), whereas 
positive announcements seem to have negative impact on negative events occurrence (-
0.142) this coefficient is statistically significant at a 1% significance level. Equation 2 and 3 
show that the lagged economic growth variable does not Granger cause none of the SCR 
revisions.  
                                                          
4 Inessa Love and Michael Abrigo developed a Stata package for Panel VAR estimation, VAR 
framework allow us to perform Granger causality test. 
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There is clear evidence that it is rating announcements that cause growth and not the opposite, 
therefore the next estimation resort to output growth as the dependent variable. The next table, 
displays the resulting pooled OLS and system-GMM estimation results. (1) presents country-specific 
features, and (2) focusses on foreign relations, namely debt and trade variables. Finally, the 
interactions equations specify how, high openness and high external indebted countries, respectively, 
have SCR announcements amplified or supported  by these evidences.      
            
 
           
 
Per capita GDP growth  Rating up  
Rating 
down 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 GDP growth𝑡−1 0.348***  0.0005  0.003 
 (0.081)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Rating up𝑡−1 2.026**  0.238**  -0.142*** 
 (0.816)  (0.121)  (0.037) 
 
Rating down𝑡−1 -3.715***  -0.272***  0.452*** 
 (1.135)  (0.088)  (0.132) 
Number of countries 28  28  28 
Observations 336   336   336 
 P-Values * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Standard error reported in parentheses. 
No higher lags are reported for lack of significance. 
 
    
Table 2 : PVAR 
estimation 
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       Interactions 
 
 
 OLS 
System-
GMM OLS 
System-
GMM OLS 
System-
GMM OLS 
System-
GMM 
      (1) (1) (2) (2) (OPENNESS )(3) (EXTERNAL DEBT)(4) 
log(l.GDP per capita)   -2.683*** -2.505*** -2.126*** -2.275*** -1.228*** -1.125** -1.436*** -1.377*** 
   (0.246) (0.484) (0.227) (0.6) (0.158) (0.457) (0.144) (0.392) 
Rating up   1.531*** 1.698*** 1.094*** 1.377*** 0.786* 1.228 1.289*** 2.162*** 
   (0.311) (0.521) (0.307) (0.471) (0.402) (0.798) (0.399) (0.726) 
Rating down  -0.635** -0.722** -0.579** -0.601 -1.659*** -1.827*** -1.572*** -2.041** 
   (0.292) (0.301) (0.287) (0.5) (0.356) (0.471) (0.574) (0.945) 
Outlook up  0.769** 0.832 1.041*** 0.23 1.032*** 0.957 1.058*** 0.125 
   (0.335) (0.731) (0.33) (0.722) (0.378) (1.033) (0.366) (0.799) 
Outlook down  -0.017 0.216 -0.407 -1.064* -0.158 -0.422 -0.685* -1.401 
   (0.351) (0.451) (0.375) (0.555) (0.4) (0.548) (0.414) (0.925) 
Gov. Expenditure  -0.207 -0.187       
   (0.041) (0.114)       
Inflation   -0.036 0.006       
   (0.059) (0.092)       
Openess   0.010*** 0.010***       
   (0.002) (0.003)       
Fertility   2.319*** 2.222**       
   (0.559) (0.973)       
Investment  -0.051* -0.065*       
   (0.027) (0.035)       
Institutions Quality  1.906*** 1.677***       
   (0.394) (0.637)       
Expected Years of Schooling 0.449*** 0.430*       
   (0.097) (0.244)       
Below investment grade   -0.995*** -0.915**     
     (0.34) (0.396)     
Tradedeficit    -0.966*** -0.995**     
     (0.258) (0.439)     
Table 3: Relation between economic 
growth and rating revisions. System 
GMM and OLS estimation 
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GIIPS     -0.522* -0.425     
     (0.307) (0.533)     
High Openess    0.633*** 0.616*     
     (0.196) (0.358)     
High External debt    -0.521** -0.564     
     (0.242) (0.353)     
High Openess*Rating up     3.180*** 1.436   
       (0.686) (1.36)   
High Openess*Rating Down     1.743*** 1.486**   
       (0.594) (0.548)   
High External Debt*Rating up       0.058 -1.132 
         (0.584) (0.775) 
High External Debt *Rating Down       0.434 1.081 
         (0.633) (1.08) 
Observations  364 364 252 252 364 364 252 252 
Number of countries  28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AB test of AR(2) (p*)   (0.79)  (0.85)  (0.42)  (0.931) 
Hansen-Test of overid. Restrictions (p*) (1)   (1)   (1)   (0.87) 
        
           
P-Values * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Estimation performed using STATA 14.0, using Pooled OLS and System-GMM through xtabond2 routine developed by David Roodman (2006) 
Robust Standard errors adjusted for panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses, constant term not reported. 
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Table 15 reports the results for the Arellano-Bond test and the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions. The serial correlation tests show no trace of higher-order 
correlation having all p-values for AR (2) larger than 0.05 which does not reject the null-
hypothesis of no serial correlation. Regarding the instrument set, the test validates the GMM 
instruments methodology with p-values equal or near unit.  
We first assess whether rating and outlook announcements are determinants of 
economic growth. To evaluate their consistency, we defined 4 equations, first controlling for 
country specific characteristics, such as the size of the public sector or institutions quality, 
secondly for country inter-relations, for instance external dependencies. Finally we 
constructed two equations composed by economically sound interactions to evaluate if having 
a) a more open economy and b) higher external debt levels, amplifies or dampens the SCR 
effects on average growth.  
All columns from table 1 manifest positive coefficients for upgrade rating revisions and 
negative coefficients for rating downgrade, in all equations the results are significant, at least 
at a 5% significance level. 
Equation (1) displays consistent results while analyzing the OLS6 vs GMM estimation 
output, positive rating announcements shows to have a positive and significant (at 1% 
significance level) correlation with average growth. When positive announcements occur the 
average growth in the subsequent five years is expected to be 1.698 (1.531) percentage points 
higher, negative rating announcement appear to, under a 5% significance level, decrease 
economic growth by 0.722 (-0.635) percentage points. On what seems to be a constant 
behavior throughout all equations, outlook revisions do not have significant impact on GDP 
growth, the exception is, in the Pooled OLS estimation where upward outlook revisions do 
seem to have positive impact growth, constantly less then positive rating announcements. All 
coefficients behave as expected and quoted above, excluding from these the Investment in 
capital formation that displays a negative, significant at a 10% significance level, coefficient 
                                                          
5 All coefficients regarding the initial state of GDP are negative and significant, which means that the 
convergence hypothesis holds.  
6 OLS coefficients are reported in parentheses, unless otherwise stated. 
 
19 
 
which can only be interpreted as bad investment decisions, supposedly taken place during the 
time-frame, might not have provided benefits to economic growth. To denote the interesting 
institutions quality coefficient, strongly significant and positive, suggesting that the interaction 
between the public and private sector has a huge importance on economic development. 
In the second equation, we control for what we ponder to be the inter-relation 
characteristics comparing countries debt levels and dependencies. The results, although with 
some fluctuations, are robust. Positive rating announcements increase economic growth by 
1.377 (1.094) percentage points, whereas negative revisions decrease the dependent variable 
by 0.579 in the OLS estimation, system-GMM ignores the significance of these variable. The 
below investment grade dummy has a significant, under a 1% significance level, which means 
that average economic growth tends to be almost 1 percentage points lower for countries 
rated below the BBB- notch. Similar results are found for countries having deficit in the trade 
balance. 
We analyzed if Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (GIIPS) have significant 
different average growth performances than the remaining panel, but the null hypothesis that 
there is no statistically difference between performances stands. Economies with larger 
degree of openness seem to boost economic growth, while we fail to prove that higher 
indebted countries have their GDP growth with high levels of foreign leverage, this failure 
hangs on variable construction with many missing values. 
Following Chen (2016), in these last equations, we add two interactions terms to each 
equation, upgrade and downgrade revisions while country 𝑖 is categorized as high openness 
(1) and high external debtor (2) at time 𝑡. As for the third specification, the rating up coefficient 
per se loses significance nevertheless the interaction High Openness*Rating up in the OLS 
estimation is significant, at a 1% significance level, and amplified by the countries openness. 
Negative rating announcements suffer an opposite impact while being highly open to the 
market, notice that the downgrade rating’s coefficient equal to -1.827, and the added 
interaction amounts to 1.486, statistically significant at a 5% significance level, totals -0.341 
that can be interpreted as the expected percentage points decrease in average growth 
produced by a downgrade to a highly commercial opened country. This result denotes weaker 
effects for negative announcement in all estimations. We resort to the flight-to-quality 
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argument to support these results, as economies with a higher degree of openness  are more 
reliable for international markets. SCR revisions effects are improved by this feature. 
Finally, we attempted to prove that high levels of external debt are harmful for average 
growth (scenario in equation (2)) and that SCR announcements would have an impaired 
outcome resultant from this. The reasoning behind this test is that a highly indebted country 
would be more sensitive to, essentially, downgrade events as the GDP portion to pay interest 
rises and governments get under creditors control. We fail to get these conclusions 
empirically, all coefficients regarding these interactions are statistically insignificant. We 
consider that this might be explained by data problems7 or even by country specific external 
debt composition that is partially in IMF hands8. 
 
The crisis effect 
The US subprime crisis burst in 2008 triggered damaging impact onto the financial 
system, specifically for our research purpose, on the sovereign debt market. The preceding 
period (before 2008) was characterized by large capital flows, economic growth (the panel’s 
average equals 3.83%) and upgrading revisions. Contrasting with the following liquidity 
tightness, recession (0.36% growth average), rising unemployment and downgrades (67 out 
of our 85 events sample take place after the crisis) witnessed all around Europe. Countries 
such as Greece, Italy, Portugal or Spain stepped into a vicious cycle of rising yields, where their 
exploding sovereign debt led to downgrade rating announcements. As these states required 
funds to support economic development, they had to incur in higher costs to compensate for 
the riskier issued bonds. At this stage, state governments would need to grow, in time 𝑡, as 
much as the interest on debt in the same year, to hold debt levels intact. This was not the case 
and debt levels were growing, which in turn led to further downgrades. During our “after the 
crisis” period, ten out of twenty-eight countries saw their sovereign bonds classified as “junk” 
bonds. Vulnerable capital inflows are considering the most important transmission channel of 
crisis effects. Significant amounts of capital were driven off Europe, caused by low interest 
rates and risk perception, to Emerging markets investment opportunities. 
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 Hereupon, we resorted to GMM estimation to understand the differences in rating 
announcements effects on average growth, before and after the crisis.  
       
Table 4: Pre-vs post crisis period.  
System-GMM estimation         
  
Rating 
up 
After 
Crisis 
Rating up*After 
Crisis 
Rating 
down 
Rating down*After 
Crisis constant    
 5.184*** 
-
3.034*** -3.671*** -1.650** 0.957 2.552*** 
 (0.707) (0.52) (1.009) (0.717) (1.103) (0.432) 
       
Observations 392 Number of Countries 28 Time dummies Yes 
AB test for AR(2) (p*) (0.525) Hansen test of overid. Restrictions (p*) (0.99)   
 
      
 
 
Table x reports the analysis for a pre vs post crisis period by adding the dummy “After 
Crisis”. As expected, this dummy variable takes a negative coefficient, significant at a 1% 
significance level, demonstrating lower average growth after 2008 compared with the base 
group, 2002-2008. 
 We added two interactions, Rating up *After Crisis-and Rating down* After Crisis, to 
analyze whether there were swings in risk appetites during the European sovereign debt crisis. 
Observing the estimation results, one can conclude that the interaction regarding positive 
rating announcements and recent time-frame binary variable is negative and significant 
(without totally offsetting the positive upward revision coefficient), meaning that upgraded 
revisions had a smaller positive impact on average growth with the outbreak of financial crisis 
paralleling with pre-crisis period. This results can be supported with financial markets 
mistrust, as investors were dealing cautiously with good news. Rating down preserves a 
negative coefficient (-1.65), significant at a 5% level, though, our interactions exhibit no 
statistical significance  
 Conclusion 
 This research looks to fill the gap between sovereign credit rating revisions (using 
Standard & Poor’s data) and economic performance, switching the focus from financial market 
P-Values * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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effects, and isolating the European sample for the 2002-2015 period. For this, we analyze SCR 
revisions’ impact on a 5-year average growth to purge out any business cycle effect. 
This research suggests that rating revisions are Granger causing economic 
performance and not the opposite. Past downgrade revisions increase the probability of new 
ones, and upgrades decrease the same likelihood.  After the system-GMM interpretation, one 
can state that upgrade (downgrade) revisions positively (negatively) influences economic 
growth. Outlook revisions are shown to be statistically insignificant. These results are robust 
to the use of different control variables. Economic openness exhibited to be a beneficial 
indicator for a country to boost SCR positive effects and to lessen downgrade effects. Finally, 
the crisis outbreak analyses infer that comparing with the pre-crisis period, rating 
announcements are perceived more cautiously. 
    In the future, we hope to develop this study further to show that: 1) high 
external debt accumulations exponentially increases the debt to GDP sensibility to downgrade 
revisions, and 2) determine the transmission channels through which rating revisions impact 
economic growth, namely the interest rate / capital inflows channel. 
  
 
References  
 
Abrigo, M. R., & Love, I. (2015). Estimation of panel vector autoregression in Stata: A package of 
programs. manuscript, Febr 2015 available on http://paneldataconference2015. 
hu/Program/Michael-Abrigo. pdf. 
Acharya, V., Drechsler, I., & Schnabl, P. (2014). A pyrrhic victory? Bank bailouts and sovereign credit 
risk. The Journal of Finance, 69(6), 2689-2739. 
Afonso, A., Gomes P., Rother, P.,2011 Short and long-run determinants of sovereign debt credit 
ratings. International Journal of Finance and Economics 16,1-15. 
Afonso, A., Furceri D.,Gomes, P .,2012. Sovereign credit ratings and financial market linkages: 
application to European data. Journal of International Money and Finance 31, 606-638. 
Afonso, A ., Gomes, P., Taamouti, A., 2014. Sovereign credit ratings markets volatility and financial 
gains. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis 76,20-33. 
Analysis. Bulletin of Economic Research, 69(2), 164-177. 
Andreasen, E., & Valenzuela, P. (2016). Financial openness, domestic financial development and 
credit ratings. Finance Research Letters, 16, 11-18. 
23 
 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence 
and an application to employment equations. The review of economic studies, 58(2), pp.277-297. 
Arellano, M., & Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models. Journal of econometrics, 68(1), 29-51 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C. R., & Lundblad, C. (2005). Does financial liberalization spur growth? Journal of 
Financial economics, 77(1), 3-55. 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., & Gilchrist, S. (1994). The financial accelerator and the flight to quality (No. 
w4789). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Boumparis, P. (2015). On the determinants of sovereign credit ratings: evidence from the Eurozone 
(Doctoral dissertation, Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας). 
Brooks, R., Faff, R. W., Hillier, D., & Hillier, J. (2004). The national market impact of sovereign rating 
changes. Journal of banking & finance, 28(1), 233-250. 
Brunnermeier, M. K., Garicano, L., Lane, P. R., Pagano, M., Reis, R., Santos, T., ... & Vayanos, D. 
(2016). The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies. The American Economic Review, 106(5), 508-
512.  
Caballero, R. J., & Krishnamurthy, A. (2008). Collective risk management in a flight to quality episode. 
The Journal of Finance, 63(5), 2195-2230. 
Cantor, R., Packer. 1996. Determinants and impact of sovereign credit rating. Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York Economic Policy Review 2, 37-53. 
Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. Default, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Credit Ratings, World Bank 
Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 151-170 
Chari, A., & Henry, P. B. (2004). Risk sharing and asset prices: evidence from a natural experiment. 
The Journal of Finance, 59(3), 1295-1324. 
Chen, S. S., Chen, H. Y., Chang, C. C., & Yang, S. L. (2016). The relation between sovereign credit rating 
revisions and economic growth. Journal of Banking & Finance, 64, 90-100. 
Christiansen, C. (2007). Volatility‐spillover effects in European bond markets. European Financial 
Management, 13(5), 923-948. 
Baum, C. F., Schäfer, D., & Stephan, A. (2016). Credit rating agency downgrades and the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crises. Journal of Financial Stability, 24, 117-131. 
D’Agostino, A. Ehrmann, M. 2013. The pricing of G7 sovereign bond spreads the times, they are a-
changin, Europen Central Bank 
Drago, D., & Gallo, R. (2017). The impact of sovereign rating changes on European syndicated loan 
spreads: The role of the rating-based regulation. Journal of International Money and Finance, 73, 
213-231. 
Gande, A., & Parsley, D. C. (2005). News spillovers in the sovereign debt market. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 75(3), 691-734. 
Granger C. J., 1969, Investigating Causal Relationships by Econometrics Models and Cross Spectral 
Methods, Econometrica, Vol. 37, pp. 425-435 
24 
 
Henry, P., Capital account liberalization, the cost of capital and economic growth. American 
Economic Review 93, 91-96. 
Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W., & Rosen, H. S. (1988). Estimating vector autoregressions with panel data. 
Econometric: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1371-1395. 
 
Ismailescu, I., & Kazemi, H. (2010). The reaction of emerging market credit default swap spreads to 
sovereign credit rating changes. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(12), 2861-2873. 
Lucas, R. E. (1990). Why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries? The American Economic 
Review, 80(2), 92-96. 
Micu, M., Remolona, E. M., & Wooldridge, P. D. (2006). The price impact of rating announcements: 
which announcements matter? 
Alsakka, R., ap Gwilym, O., & Vu, T. N. (2014). The sovereign-bank rating channel and rating agencies' 
downgrades during the European debt crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance, 49, 235-
257. 
Reinhart, C., Rogoff, K.,2010. Growth in a time of debt. American Economic Review 100, 573-578 
Reisen, H., & Von Maltzan, J. (1999). Boom and bust and sovereign ratings. International Finance, 
2(2), 273-293. 
 Roodman, D. 2006. How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. 
Center for Global Development working paper, (103). 
Roodman, D. 2009. A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
statistics, 71(1), 135-158. 
Soudis, D. (2017). Determinants of Sovereign Bonds Ratings: A Robustness  
Sy, A. N. (2004). Rating the rating agencies: Anticipating currency crises or debt crises?. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 28(11), 2845-2867. 
Tamegawa, K. (2016). Rating for government debt and economic stability. The Journal of Economic 
Asymmetries, 13, 35-44. 
Vernazza, D. R., & Nielsen, E. F. (2015). The Damaging Bias of Sovereign Ratings. Economic Notes, 
44(2), 361-408. 
Warnock, F. E., & Warnock, V. C. (2009). International capital flows and US interest rates. Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 28(6), 903-919. 
World Bank, 2010. World Development Indicators, Washington DC. 
Xavier Sala-I-Martin & Gernot Doppelhofer & Ronald I. Miller, 2004. "Determinants of Long-Term 
Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach," American 
Appendix 
 
25 
 
Table 5 
 
  
Table of countries 
Austria Estonia Italy Portugal 
Belgium Finland Latvia Romania 
Bulgaria France Lithuania Slovak Republic 
Croatia Germany Luxembourg Slovenia 
Cyprus Greece Malta Spain 
Czech Republic  Hungary Netherlands Sweden 
Denmark Ireland Poland United Kingdom 
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Table 6:Variables description 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Variable Description Source 
5-years average GDP per capita growth The dependent variable defined as the mean of the real per capita GDP growth 
for country i, calculated over a five-year period from t to t+4 Authors calculation 
GDP per capita growth 
GDP per capita growth rate 
World Development 
Indicators 
Rating up Binary variable that equals 1 if there is an upward revision on rating grade in 
country i at time t, 0 otherwise Trading Economics 
Rating down Binary variable that equals 1 if there is a downward revision on rating grade in 
country i at time t, 0 otherwise Trading Economics 
Outlook up Binary variable that equals 1 if there is an upward revision on outlook in 
country i at time t, 0 otherwise Trading Economics 
Outdown Binary variable that equals 1 if there is a downward revision on outlook in 
country i at time t, 0 otherwise Trading Economics 
Government Expenditure 
Government expenditure level as a percentage of GDP. 
World Development 
Indicators 
Inflation 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index  
World Development 
Indicators 
Fertility rate Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a 
woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years 
World Development 
Indicators 
Investment in capital formation Gross capital formation (private and public investment in fixed assets, changes 
in inventories, and net acquisitions of valuables) as a percentage of GDP. 
World Development 
Indicators 
Institutions Quality Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
governance performance). 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators. 
Years of schooling 
Expected Years of Education 
World Development 
Indicators 
Openess Trade 
Sum of imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP. 
World Development 
Indicators 
tradedeficit (dummy) Binary variable that equals 1, if country i denotes deficit on current account at 
time t, 0 otherwise 
World Development 
Indicators 
High openness trade country(dummy) Binary variable that equals 1 if country i is in the top quartile (calculated within 
the sample) of external debt/GDP at time t, 0 otherwise. Authors calculation 
High openness*Rating up (Int) High openness country having a upward revision Authors calculation 
High openness*Rating down (Int) High openness country having a downward revision Authors calculation 
Below Investment Grade country (dummy) Binary variable that equals 1 if country i is below investment grade (BBB)at 
time t, 0 otherwise Trading Economics 
Net external debt  
A proxy for net external debt using official international investment position 
"External Wealth of 
Nations" Dataset 
High external indebted country (dummy) Binary variable that equals 1 if country i is in the top quartile (calculated within 
the sample) of external debt/GDP at time t, 0 otherwise. Authors calculation 
High external*Rating up (Int) High external indebted country having upward revision Authors calculation 
High external*Rating down (Int) High external indebted country having downward revision Authors calculation 
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Upgrade 
(outlook-rating) 
 
Downgrade 
(outlook-rating) 
Number Country Year Frequency  Year Frequency 
1 Austria 2013o 1-0  2012,2012 o 1-1 
2 Belgium 2014 o  1-0  2010 o,2011,2012 o 2-1 
3 Bulgaria  2002, 2003, 2004,  2-5  2008,2013 o,2014 1-2 
  2005, 2005 o,2006,2009 o     
4 Croatia 2004 o 1-0  2008 o,2010, 2012,2013 
o,2014,2015 o 
3-3 
5 Cyprus 2007 o,2008,2014,2015 1-3   2010, 2011, 2012,2013, 0-4 
6 Czech Republic  2005 o, 2007, 2010 o,2011 2-2   0-0 
7 Denmark   0-0   0-0 
8 Estonia  2003 o,2004,2005 o, 2010, 2011 2-3  2006 o,2007 o,2009 2-1 
9 Finland 2002,2013 o       1-1  2012 o,2014,2015 o 2-1 
10 France  0-0  2012,2013,2014 o 1-2 
11 
12 
Greece 
Germany 
 2003, 2012,2014 0-3 
0-0 
 2004 o, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012,2015 
1-5 
0-0 
13 Hungary 2014 o,2015 1-1  2006, 2008, 2009, 2010 
o,2011, 2012,2013 o 
2-5 
14 Ireland 2013 o,2014,2015 1-2  2009, 2010, 2011,2012 o 1-3 
15 Italy  0-0  2003
 o,2004, 2006, 2011, 
2012,2013,2014 
1-6 
16 Latvia 2002,2003 o, 2004, 2010, 2011 
o,2012,2013,2014 
2-6  2007, 2008, 2009 0-3 
17 
18 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
2002, 2003,2003 o, 2004, 
2005,2005 o,2010 o,2013 o,2014 
2013 o 
4-5 
1-0 
 2007 o,2008, 2009 
2012 o 
1-2 
1-0 
19 Malta 
Netherlands 
2015 o 
2015 o,2015 
1-0 
1-1 
  2012,2013 
2012 o,2013 
0-2 
1-1 
20 Poland 2004 o,2005 o 2007,2008 o 3-1   0-0 
21 Portugal 2015 0-1  2004 o,2005, 2009,2009 o, 2010, 
2011, 2012 
2-5 
22 Romania 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,2005 
o,2006 o,2014 
2-5   2007 o,2008 1-1 
23 Germany  0-0   0-0 
24 Slovakia 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008,2008 
o,2014 o,2015 
2-5   2012 0-1 
25 Slovenia 2002 o,2003, 2004, 2006,,2015 o 2-3  2010 o,2011, 2012,2013,2014 o 2-3 
26 Spain 2003 o,2004,2013 o,2014,2015 2-3  2009 o,2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012,2012 o 
2-4 
27 Sweden 2004 0-1   0-0 
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United Kingdom 
 
 
2010 o,2014 o 
 
 
2-0 
 
 
  
2009 o,2012 o,2015 o 
 
3-0 
Total  35 outlooks up revisions,51 rating 
up revisions 
 30  Outlooks down revisons,55 rating 
down revisions 
 
“o” Denotes outlook revision 
Table 7: Rating and outlook, S & P, 
announcements in the 2002-2015 
period 
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